On 24 February 2025, the EU adopted the 16th sanctions package against Russia. On the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU is thus maintaining its sanctions policy with the aim of further increasing pressure on Russia. The new EU sanctions package contains a large number of tightening measures concerning Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and Regulation (EU) 833/2014 against Russia.
At the same time, the 16th package of EU sanctions also includes new sanctions against Belarus, the Crimea/Sevastopol region and the regions of Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, which are not controlled by the Ukrainian Government, through corresponding amendments to Regulation (EC) 765/2006, Regulation (EU) 692/2014 and Regulation (EU) 2022/263 .
The measures of the latest EU sanctions package are implemented by Regulation (EU) 2025/390, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/389, Regulation (EU) 2025/395, Regulation (EU) 2025/392, Regulation (EU) 2025/398 and Regulation (EU) 2025/401.
Overview
The 16th EU sanctions package targets key areas of the Russian economy with its measures. The new sanctions focus on trade, energy, transport, infrastructure and financial services. In addition to the introduction of the import ban on Russian primary aluminium, the export restrictions have also been expanded to include other goods, particularly in Annex VII and Annex XXIII of Regulation (EU) 833/2014.
The sanctions in the energy sector now include, among other things, a ban on goods and services for oil projects in Russia, which comes in addition to the already existing ban on LNG projects. The introduction of a ban on transactions with certain seaports and airports in Russia and the ban on the provision of construction services is intended to weaken Russian infrastructure. In addition, 13 Russian banks will be disconnected from the SWIFT system in mid-March 2025. A transaction ban was imposed on three banks based outside Russia for the first time against the background that these banks allegedly used the Russian Central Bank’s system for the transmission of financial communications (SPFS) to circumvent EU sanctions.
In addition, further measures have been taken against disinformation campaigns and to combat the circumvention of sanctions. Aside from the additions to the various sanctions lists, it should be emphasized in this context that the “best efforts obligation” introduced for the first time with the 14th EU sanctions package can now be found in all five sanctions regulations. Consequently, the scope of the due diligence obligations of the EU operators concerned expands accordingly. The special due diligence obligations under Art. 12gb Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Art. 8ga Regulation (EU) 765/2006 have also been extended regarding the relevant group of goods and will in future also apply to goods listed in a new annex. The group of companies that must carry out special risk analyses and compliance measures and, if necessary, ensure that their third-country subsidiaries take corresponding measures will therefore increase.
To prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia, some provisions of the 16th sanctions package were also extended to Belarus and harmonised in this respect. In addition, the EU has updated and tightened its sanctions regulations against Crimea and Sevastopol as well as against the regions not controlled by the Ukrainian government in the Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhya regions.
Extension of sanctions lists
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/389 added a further 48 persons and 35 entities to Annex I to Regulation (EU) 269/2014 whose assets in the EU are now subject to freezing and are not to be provided with funds or economic resources. This affects companies that are said to support Russia’s military-industrial complex, are involved in circumventing sanctions or have links to the Russian shadow fleet. A Russian crypto exchange is also listed.
Particularly noteworthy is the introduction of Art. 15a into Regulation (EU) 269/2014, which also stipulates a “best efforts obligation” in this Regulation, analogous to the due diligence obligation introduced with the 14th EU sanctions package under Art. 8a of Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The previously existing gap regarding the prevention of the undermining of the sanction measures by third-country subsidiaries regarding the prohibitions on making available and freezing of assets laid down in the Regulation has thus been closed.
A “best efforts obligation” was also introduced in Article 8a of Regulation (EU) 692/2014 (Crimea/Sevastopol) and in Article 13a of Regulation (EU) 2022/263 (Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhia regions). The EU operators already affected by Art. 8a of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Art. 8i of Regulation (EC) 765/2006 must significantly expand their measures to fulfil their due diligence obligations towards their third-country subsidiaries and align them with the measures associated with these embargo regulations. At the same time, the associated liability risk also increases if this obligation is not fulfilled to the required extent.
Tightening of the sanctions of Regulation (EU) 833/2014
However, the majority of the measures of the 16th EU sanctions package relate to the restrictions of Regulation (EU) 833/2014.
Import ban on primary aluminium
In addition to the already existing import sanctions for processed aluminium products from Russia or of Russian origin, primary aluminium is now also sanctioned as an economic source of revenue for Russia in accordance with Article 3i of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 by including unwrought aluminium in Annex XXI. However, with effect until 26 February 2026, a transitional arrangement will initially be created in accordance with Article 3 (3cg) of Regulation (EU) 833/2014. During this period, a quota of a total of 275,000 tonnes of primary aluminium can still be imported from Russia. In addition, according to Art. 3i para. 3ch, there is a derogation according to which contracts concluded before 25 February 2025 may still be fulfilled until the end of 2026. However, this temporary provision is limited to a total import volume of 50,000 tonnes into the EU.
Extension of goods-related export and transit bans
The export restrictions of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 were also extended to include other goods. Annex VII, which covers the goods that could contribute to the military and technological strengthening of Russia or to the development of the defence and security sector, has been added, inter alia, by chemical precursors for riot control agents (X.A.VIII.021(h)), software related to the development, manufacture or use of CNC equipment (X.D.X.007), chromium and various chromium compounds (CN codes: 2610 00, 2819 10, 2819 90, 8112 21, 8112 22 and 8112 29). Even video game controllers (X.A.III.101 (i)) used to control drones are sanctioned and are now also subject to the prohibitions under Art. 2a of Regulation (EU) 833/2024.
Furthermore, Annex XXIII, which is related to the prohibitions of Art. 3k of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, now also covers other specific minerals, chemicals, steel, glass materials and fireworks that are said to be of particular military relevance. These include goods under the following CN codes: 2518 (dolomite), 2519 (magnesia), 2520 (gypsum), 2615 (niobium, tantalum, vanadium, zirconium ores), 3604 (fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles), 3605 (matches), 3604 (cerium iron and other ignition alloys), 4811 41 / 4811 49 (paper and cardboard), 6814 (processed mica and mica products), 7007 19 / 7007 21 (single-layer and laminated safety glass) and 7320 10 (leaf springs and spring leaves made of iron or steel).
However, for the goods listed in Annex XXIIID, there is still a derogation for contracts concluded before 25 February 2025 regarding their performance until 26 May 2025.
In addition, to avoid risks regarding circumvention, the group of items listed in Annex XXVII that are affected by a transit ban via Russia pursuant to Article 3k (1a) of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 has also been significantly expanded.
Extension of Annex IV and tightening of restrictions on listed persons and entities
As in the most recent EU sanctions packages against Russia, Annex IV has once again been expanded. This time, 53 new companies have been assigned to Russia’s military-industrial complex or have been assigned involvement in sanctions evasion. It should be emphasised that the majority of the newly listed companies are not based in Russia, but in China, Hong Kong, India, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Singapore.
With regard to the restrictions associated with Annex IV, which were previously designed as a restriction of the approvability of exemptions in accordance with Art. 2b of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the provision has now been tightened. It is now formulated as an independent prohibition provision with a comparable regulatory structure to Articles 2 and 2a of Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The export of items listed in Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation and Annex VII of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 to persons and companies covered by Annex IV who are not only located in Russia is now expressly prohibited. This also applies to the provision of related services, financing, brokerage services and IP rights.
Extension of the list of ships of the “Shadow Fleet”
Furthermore, no fewer than 74 additional ships, which are said to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet, were added to Annex XLII as part of the 16th EU sanctions pact. The Annex has thus almost doubled in size. These ships are said to have been used to circumvent the oil price cap, transport stolen grain or cultural goods from Ukraine or military equipment.
A ship listed in Annex XLII is subject to a ban on access to ports and locks in the EU, a ban on buying, selling and chartering and a wide range of other bans on maritime transport, ship supply and other services in accordance with Art. 3s of Regulation (EU) 833/2014.
New sanctions in the energy sector
The new sanctions in the energy sector include, on the one hand, the extension of the ban under Art. 3t. The provision of goods, technologies and services for the completion of crude oil projects in Russia, such as exploration or production projects, is now prohibited alongside corresponding actions in relation to LNG projects. This is intended to counteract the expansion of Russian production volumes and reduce Russia’s corresponding sources of income. Here, too, there is a derogation for the fulfilment of contracts until 26 May 2025, as long they were concluded before 25 February 2025.
These measures are flanked by the inclusion of oil and gas exploration software in Annex II of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 with the consequence of a ban on the sale, export or making available of this software pursuant to Art. 3 (1a).
On the other hand, the temporary storage and transfer of Russian crude oil or Russian petroleum products to the free zone procedure in EU ports is now generally prohibited under the newly introduced Art. 3nb of Regulation (EU) 833/2014. This was previously still permitted provided that the oil complied with the price cap and was transported to a third country.
Further flight ban for air carriers
As a new sanction measure in the area of traffic restrictions, it should be emphasized that, in accordance with Article 3d (1b) of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, there is now also a comprehensive flight ban in the EU for third-country air carriers outside Russia that operate domestic flights in Russia or supply aviation goods to Russian air carriers covered by Annex XLVI or generally deliver for flights within Russia.
Transaction ban regarding Russian ports, locks and airports
In the area of measures to weaken Russian infrastructure, a comprehensive transaction ban is introduced by the new Article 5ae of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 in respect of the ports and locks listed in Annex XLVII, Part A, as well as the airports listed in Annex XLVII, Part B. This applies, for example, to the two Moscow airports (Vnukovo International Airport and Zhukovsky International Airport), the Volga port of Astrakhan and the port of Makhachkala on the Caspian Sea. The seaports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk on the Baltic Sea and Novorossiysk on the Black Sea were also included. However, the transaction ban is associated with numerous exceptions to avoid disruptions to legal trade or impairments of private contacts.
Ban on construction services
With the inclusion of the ban on the provision of construction services, including building and civil engineering works, pursuant to Article 5n (2) of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, another sanction measure relevant to Russia’s infrastructure has been created.
Extension of financial sanctions
As sanctions against the Russian financial sector, 13 additional, mainly smaller Russian banks will be decoupled from the SWIFT system with effect from 17 March 2025 by being included in Annex XIV in accordance with Article 5h of Regulation (EU) 833/2014.
The inclusion of Annex XLIV is the first time that a comprehensive transaction ban under Article 5ac (2) of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 is directed against three banks based outside Russia, as they are said to have used the system of the Russian Central Bank for the transmission of financial communications (SPFS) to circumvent EU sanctions.
Revocation of broadcasting licenses for media companies
To counteract ongoing disinformation and manipulation campaigns controlled from Russia, eight other media companies have now been banned from broadcasting in the EU respectively the necessary licences have been withdrawn by means of a corresponding extension of Annex XV in accordance with Article 2f of Regulation (EU) 833/2014.
Extension of special due diligence obligations due to new list of goods
In the context of the aim of improving the measures to avoid the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus with regard to the so-called Common High Priority items, it should be highlighted that the special due diligence obligation under Article 12gb of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Article 8ga of Regulation (EC) 765/2006 has been tightened by the 16th EU sanctions package with regard to the relevant group of goods.
It is true that the circle of CHP goods in Annex XL or Annex XXX has not been extended. However, a further annex with sensitive goods has been created in the respective regulation. The items covered by Annex XLVIII to Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Annex XXXI to Regulation (EC) 765/2006 are certain generator sets falling within CN code 8502 20 and ‘other switches’ falling within CN code 8536 50. These goods are said to have been found in the drones of Chinese and Iranian manufacturers.
From 26 May 2025, the affected EU operators who sell or export these goods will now be obliged to carry out a risk analysis and establish appropriate risk mitigation measures against circumvention attempts. They must also ensure that risk analyses and risk mitigation measures are also carried out, where appropriate, by their third-country subsidiaries when they trade in such goods. Since CN code 8536 50 in particular concerns a large range of electrical switches, the circle of addressees for whom the scope of Article 12gb of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and Article 8ga of Regulation (EC) 765/2006 is open is significantly expanded and their liability risk is also increased in the event of insufficient fulfilment of their due diligence obligation.
Update and harmonization of sanctions against Belarus, Crimea/Sevastopol and the non-Ukrainian-controlled regions of Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhia
In order to prevent EU sanctions from being circumvented via Belarus due to the close ties between the Russian and Belarusian economies, the 16th EU sanctions package with Regulation (EU) 2025/392 contains numerous tightenings of Regulation (EC) 765/2006 in order to align the sanctions against Belarus with those against Russia and thus close gaps. In addition to the measures already mentioned, this concerns tightening in the areas of trade, services, transport, infrastructure, financial services and measures against the circumvention of sanctions.
In addition, the 16th EU sanctions package by Regulation (EU) 2025/401 and Regulation (EU) 2025/398 also updated and strengthened the sanctions measures against Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the non-government-controlled areas of the Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Regulation (EU) 692/2014 and Regulation (EU) 2022/263 have not been significantly amended since their adoption in 2014 and 2022 respectively and have now been revised, in particular with the aim of limiting circumvention. Among other things, the existing export restrictions on high-risk goods were expanded and extensive service bans were created.
Conclusion
The 16th EU sanctions package is more extensive and more detailed than initially expected. Despite, or perhaps because of, the developments in US foreign policy towards Russia, the EU continues to take decisive action against Russia and the ongoing aggression against Ukraine. The fight against sanctions circumvention is at the focus of many measures in the 16th EU sanctions package. As part of this, the due diligence obligations for EU operators are constantly being increased. It is necessary for EU operators to deal with the increasingly complex provisions in order to fulfil the compliance requirements, identify risks of circumvention and take appropriate measures to counteract them. Vischer Voss would be pleased to support you in improving your company’s individual export control and sanctions compliance and minimising liability risks.
